Butler University

Digital Commons @ Butler University
Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS

College of Liberal Arts & Sciences

Spring 2019

"A Flood of Problems" in Michigan: An Urban Environmental
History
Nancy M. Germano

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers
Part of the History Commons

“A Flood of Problems” in Michigan:
An Urban Environmental History
By
N ancy Germano
Spring rains produced “A Flood of Problems,” announced the front
page of the Kalamazoo Gazette on Saturday, April 19, 1975. The previous
evening’s four-inch downpour exceeded the city’s total rainfall for the
entire month of April 1974 (3.59 inches) and April 1973 (3.99 inches).
The newspaper’s reporters detailed local “problems,” including flooded
roads, overflowing sewer systems, and flooded basements in homes near
the sewage treatment plant. Lansing and Flint also experienced heavy rain.
Flooding and mudslides closed Interstates 75, 96, and 496 and US
Highway 23. A mudslide on westbound 1-496 in Lansing trapped several
vehicles, including a fire engine.1 Flooding across the state was described
as the “worst since 1947.” With expected damage in the millions of
dollars, Governor William G. Milliken asked President Gerald R. Ford for
federal disaster aid for fourteen counties.2
While Lansing endured the initial brunt of the 1975 storm emergency,
Kalamazoo remained in the path of rising waters and suffered subsequent
damage. Kalamazoo authorities evacuated eighty area families from their
homes, while others voluntarily abandoned their homes. City crews
worked round the clock to fill sandbags and pump out basements.
Kalamazoo Township Supervisor F. E. Griffith told a Gazette reporter
that the fire department gave top priority to pumping basements for those
homes that would not fill with water again, explaining that it was not
practical to pump an entire neighborhood surrounded by a pond of water.
City health officials warned homeowners to avoid contact with the water
because of probable pollution from septic systems, to disinfect walls and
household items, and to throw away all food items except canned goods.
The Gazette also ran an article featuring warnings by the US Department
o f Housing and Urban Developm ent o f the hazards that might await

1 “Kalamazoo All Awash! 4-Inch Rainfall Drenches Area,” Kalamazoo Gazette
(hereafter KG), 19 April 1975.
2 “Five Area Counties Involved,” KG, 21 April 1975.
The Michigan Historical Review 45:1 (Spring 2019): 81-107
©2019 Central Michigan University. ISSN 0890-1686
All Rights Reserved

82

The Michigan Historical Review

occupants returning to flood-damaged homes, including structural
damage, gas leaks, and electrical system damage.3
As flooding receded, municipal public works crews and federal
disaster teams inspected for damage and assessed the costs. President Ford,
himself from southwestern Michigan, declared his home state a major
disaster area. Statewide, April’s flooding caused $75 million worth of
damage.4 In Kalamazoo, Civil Defense Director Walter Jones estimated $1
million in public costs for township police, fire, patrol, and rescue workers,
along with damage to private homes and businesses that equaled or
exceeded that amount.5 Perhaps to reassure traumatized residents with
long-term perspective, the Gazette ran a follow-up piece— “Flooding a Part
of Kalamazoo Fhstory”—which showed photographs of past floods and
lightheartedly noted that “historically, on occasion, life is ‘goo’ in
Kalamazoo.”6
In this article, Kalamazoo serves as an important case history for
exploring urban Michigan’s complex relationships with riverine
landscapes.7 This is not a story of inevitable environmental degradation
resulting from human settlement patterns and intervention in the natural
processes of the floodplain.8 Nonetheless, Kalamazoo’s urban flood
history does represent persistent conflicts between urban land
development rights and a city’s desire to capitalize on its natural wealth,
on the one hand, and community and environmental security and
sustainability on the other. I begin with a biographical examination of the
city and its river, focusing on how people experienced flooding firsthand.9
3 “It Depends on Rainfall,” KG, 23 April 1975; “Dozen Families Flee Homes,” KG,
23 April 1975; “It Spells Trouble! Floods Causing Some Problems, Worries, Unusual
Circumstances,” KG, 23 April 1975; “Enter Flooded Home Carefully,” KG, 24 April 1975.
4 “Kalamazoo to Receive Flood Aid,” KG, 28 April 1975.
3 “Water Level Drops,” KG, 25 April 1975.
6 “Flooding a Part of Kalamazoo History,” KG, 26 April 1975.
7 This article is based in part on the author’s doctoral dissertation, “The Urban
Midwest’s ‘Dangerous Friends’: At the Confluence of Flooding Rivers, an Environmental
Movement, and a National Insurance Program” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 2017).
8 See, for example, George P. Marsh, The Earth as Modified by Human Action: A New
Edition ojMan and Nature (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1874);James P. Kemper,
Rebellious River: Use andAbuse ofAmerica’s NaturalResources (Boston, MA: Bruce Humphries,
Inc., 1949).
9 1 take the approach of geographers and environmental historians such as John O.
Anfinson, The River We Have Wrought: A History of the Upper Mississippi (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Mark Cioc, The Rhine: A n Eco-biogmphy, 1815-2000
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); and Grace Karskens, “Floods and Floodmindedness in Early Colonial Australia,” Environmental History 21 (2016): 315-342.
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Next, I explore how local, state, and federal actors intersected to manage
inconveniendy “abundant” water and to conquer problem flooding, as a
particularly Midwestern problem.10 This necessarily involves intersections
between problem-solving and politics.*11 Finally, I examine the economics
of environmentalism in the context of urban water management. I pay
special attention to flood insurance as a critical mechanism for negotiating
the political and legal quagmires of public interests and private rights.12
In the twenty-first century, Michigan cities continue to battle extreme
and locally-catastrophic flood events. From this struggle emerges a
reasonable question: At what point should flood disasters be approached
as unnatural and avoidable events, rather than “natural” and
“unavoidable” (as in, “on occasion, life is ‘goo’”)?

A Biography of the Kalamazoo River Basin
In the Michigan Territory of the late 1820s, Euro-American settlers
began arriving at the future site o f Kalamazoo County. Settlers discovered
fertile prairie land, rolling hills, and fresh-water rivers, creeks, and lakes.
These were legacies of Pleistocene Epoch glaciers. When the glaciers’
Lake Michigan Lobe paused during its northwesterly recession, it released
large quantities of till, forming the Kalamazoo moraine. While the lobe
remained stable, melting ice transported outwash away from the moraine,
creating an outwash plain. Simultaneously, the Saginaw Lobe retreated in
a northeasterly direction, forming the Tekonsha moraine in the eastern
part of the county and creating another outwash plain. The glaciers’
10 Lynne Heasley and Daniel Macfarlane, “Introduction,” in Border Flows: A Century
eds. Heasley and Macfarlane (Calgary, Alberta:
University of Calgary Press, 2016), 8; David B. Walker, “The Nature and Systemic Impact
of ‘Creative Federalism,’” in The Great Society and Its Legag: Twenty Years o fU .S . Social Polig,
eds. Marshall Kaplan and Peggy Cuciti (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 197199,207.
11 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel o fE jfc ie n g : The Progressive Conservation
Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959); John McPhee,
The Control o f N ature (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989); Karen M. O’Neill, Rivers by
Design: State Power and the Origins o fU .S. Flood Control (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2006); Rutherford H. Platt, F a n d Use and Sociey: Geography, I m w , and Public Polig , rev. ed.
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2004).
12 Ari Kelman, A River and Its City: The N ature o f Landscape in N ew Orleans (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003); David Welky, The Thousand-Year Flood: The OhioMississippi Disaster o f 1937 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Donald Worster,
Rivers o f Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth o f the American West (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985).
o f the Canadian-American Water Relationship,
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A m ap of K alam azoo County and the K alam azoo River corridor.
Source: Kalcounty.com

periods of retreat, re-advance, and stability left the county with morainic
ridges, outwash plains, lakes, streams, and poorly drained bogs and ponds.13
The Kalamazoo River Valley likely formed when runoff to the river
eroded the valley to a depth of more than 150 feet “below the adjacent
hills of the moraine and outwash plain,” with a floodplain floor more than
one mile wide in places.14 The Kalamazoo River system drains
approximately 2,000 square miles in ten counties in southwest Michigan.
Its north branch heads in lakes in Jackson County, and the south branch
arises from marshland in Hillsdale County, with the two branches joining

13 Lloyd J. Schmaltz, “Surficial Geology,” in Kalamazoo County: Geology and the
,Environment, ed. Richard N. Passero, et al. (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University,
1978), 17.
^ Ibid., 22.
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at Albion. From there, the river’s main stem continues its northwesterly
path to Lake Michigan, with the mouth located near the towns of Douglas
and Saugatuck. It enters Kalamazoo County at the northeast corner and
flows southwesterly until taking a northern turn at Kalamazoo and exiting
the county on a northerly path. The river system drains approximately
56% of Kalamazoo County (the northern portion). The St. Joseph River
system drains 43% of the county (the southern portion), and the Paw Paw
River System drains the remaining 1%.15
The city’s founder, Titus Bronson, built his claim shanty in the
floodplain on the west side of the river in the summer of 1829. By 1836,
the fast-growing village faced its first flooding problems, when high water
covered the road near the Main Street bridge. In May 1858, the
Kalamazoo River again flooded the Main Street bridge, and its Portage
Creek and Arcadia Creek tributaries flooded their banks. A large portion
of the village flooded, with Whitcomb’s Mill and Distillery incurring
especially heavy damage. Floods followed in 1854, 1864, 1868,1869, and
1887.16
Despite flood risks, Kalamazoo industries continued to expand
within the floodplain of the river and its tributaries. Most famous today
are the Dutch immigrants, who arrived as early as 1850. They introduced
a strain of celery seeds that later earned Kalamazoo its national reputation
as the “Celery City.” Celery requires rich soil with constant moisture to
grow , and the area’s p lentiful “ m uckland” p rovided those m oist
15William B. Harrison, “Surface Water,” in Kalamazoo County, 45; Michigan Department
of Natural Resources, Fisheries Division, Lower Kalamazoo River Natural River Plan, rev. 12
March 2002 (Lansing: Michigan Department of Namral Resources, July 1981), 2-6,
michigan.gov/documents/Lower_Kalamazoo_River_Plan_2301 l_7.pdf (accessed 15
March 2017).
16Willis F. Dunbar, Kalamazoo and How it Grew. .. and Grew. . . (Kalamazoo: Western
Michigan University, 1969), 2-5, 23-26, 32-37; Samuel W. Durant, History of Kalamazoo
County, Michigan: with illustrations and biographical sketches of its prominent men and pioneers
(Philadelphia, PA: Everts & Abbott, 1880), 208-213, 217, 219, 220, 223, 263; Susan E.
Gray, “Land Speculator as Confidence Man: Mumford Eldred, Jr., and the Michigan Land
Rush,” journal of the Early Republic 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1990): 387-388; Michigan Water
Resources Commission, Flood Conditions in the Kalamazoo Area (Lansing: Michigan Water
Resources Commission, July 1957), 1. Bronson is described as generous and scrupulously
honest, but an eccentric man who offended others. Historians surmise that the name
change was an effort to disassociate the town from the man. In addition to the village
name change, on January 23, 1837, the village newspaper owner changed the name of the
Michigan Statesman to Kalamazoo Gazette. First published on October 2, 1835, it is the oldest
newspaper in the state outside of Detroit.
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A postcard showing one of Kalamazoo’s many celery fields, c. 1911
Source: Kalamazoo Public Library Historical Photographs, Flickr Commons

conditions. By the end of the century, Kalamazoo had approximately
4,000 acres in celery culdvation and around 400 farms employed 3,500
workers.17
The still-larger pulp and paper industry also capitalized on
Kalamazoo River water. Paper-making required an abundant water
supply, a power source like hydro-electricity, and a means to carry away
waste, such as a river current. Early paper production used straw from
nearby wheat and rye fields, but later production depended upon the
area’s hardwood forests. By the turn of the century, paper mills lined the
banks of the river and its tributaries.18
The village itself needed a coordinated water system to fight fires, for
household use, and for sewage drainage. Public and private drains handled
17 Dunbar, Kalamazoo, 47-48, 61-63, 99-100; Durant, History of Kalamazoo County, 225,
230; John T. Houdek and Charles F. Heller, Jr., “The Emergence o f Prosperous Farmers
and Businessmen in Nineteenth-Century Kalamazoo County, Michigan,” Michigan
Historical Review 37, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 56-58; John A. Jakle and James O. Wheeler, “The
Changing Residential Structure o f the Dutch Population in Kalamazoo, Michigan,” Annals
of the Association ofAmerican Geographers 59, no. 3 (September 1969): 446-447.
18 Dunbar, Kalamayoo, 89-91; Durant, History ofKalamazoo County, 256; Larry B. Massie
and Peter J. Schmitt, Kalamazoo: The Place Behind the Products, sponsored by Kalamazoo
Chamber o f Commerce (Windsor Publications, 1981), 121-124,149-150.
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Riverside F oundry during a Kalam azoo River flood, c. 1900
Source: Kalamazoo Valley Museum Photograph File and Kalamazoo Public Library

Kalamazoo’s sewage, emptying into area waterways. Sewage disposal was
such an essential service that, in 1881, Kalamazoo trustees amended the
village charter to provide for a board of sewerage commissioners and a
more coordinated program for ensuring public health. The board had a
trunk line constructed on Vine Street, and lateral lines were constructed
on other downtown streets. The new sewer system emptied directly into
the Kalamazoo River.19
By 1884, Kalamazoo’s population reached approximately 16,000
(when it incorporated as a city). By 1900, the city’s population had
increased to 24,404. At that point, city officials began to keep records of
flood stages. Just four years later, Kalamazoo experienced its most
destructive flood. The “great flood” of March 1904 covered nearly two
square miles of the city, closed factories, handicapped transportation, and
caused upwards of $50,000 in damages, including the lost wages of factory
workers. The front page of the March 26, 1904, Gazette announced the
arrival o f the “Worst Flood Ever Known in History of City.”20 The east
side was under water; there were floods on the south side, deserted
homes, floating animals, and washed-out roads and railroad tracks. Sewer
lines emptying into the river raised concerns about public health dangers
19 Dunbar, Kalamazoo, 93-94; Durant, History ofKalamazoo County, 259, 268-269.
20 “Kalamazoo Valley Raging Flood,” KG, 26 March 1904.
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Flooded homes in the East Vine Street area of Kalamazoo, March 27,1904
Source: Kalamazoo Public library History Room Photograph File

from the flood water. The flood of 1904 provided the city with a baseline
comparison for floods to follow in 1908 and 1918.21
This continuous and often-destructive flood pattern became well
known but did not prevent mostly unchecked urban growth. By the mid
twentieth century, Kalamazoo’s built environment and related urban
infrastructure had consumed the river’s floodplain. Kalamazooans
developed all available water resources— mucklands, rivers, and creeks.
Simultaneously, though, city, state, and federal officials did apply expertise
and management techniques to mitigate flooding. They also attempted to
reconcile conflicting ideas about local responsibility, state governance,
and federal assistance. An examination of both governance and specific
methods reveal flood control efforts that nonetheless went astray.
Officials and residents lost sight of the biography o f the river valley. The

21 D unbar, Kalamazoo, 86, 103; “Loss A m ounts to $50,000,” KG, 5 April 1904;
M ichigan W ater Resources Com m ission, Flood Conditions in the Kalamazoo Area, 1-2.
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T he Bryant Paper C om pany was am ong the Kalamazoo businesses to
suffer flood dam age in 1914.
Source: Western Michigan University Photograph and Kalamazoo Public 1.ibrary

1975 flood was typical o f the ensuing dangers of growth that capitalized
on but could not fully control a dynamic urban landscape.

Managing the Floodplain’s Risk
b o c a l S olutions

As Kalamazoo faced twentieth-century urban growing pains,
managing the floodplain became a priority. After extensive flooding in the
1930s, city officials applied to the federal Works Progress Administration
(WPA) for funds to complete a flood-control project. The agency
approved the project to reclaim approximately seventy acres of land for
industrial, park, or playground sites along a three-mile stretch of the
Kalamazoo River. The work also included cleaning the river and creeks,
“banking up” river walls, removing sandbars and kinks in the river, and
constructing control basins and reservoirs. The project involved
development as well: to develop, landscape, and beautify the area with
parks and boulevards; and to plat new streets with lots “suitable for first
class dwellings or for business establishments.”22 A further benefit:
several years of employment for large numbers of men, with the WPA

22 “City Acquires Land in Flood Control Move,” KG, 21 May 1940.
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Map of Kalamazoo Quadrangle, 1918. Managing the river floodplain
became a priority as the urban area expanded.
Source: US Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, at
www.oldmapsonline.org/m ap/usgs/5442852

paying the majority of costs. The Gazette reported that this project would
be the “largest flood control program ever planned by the city,” and
Kalamazoo officials fully expected it to place the city on a “virtually ‘high
and dry’ basis so far as floods are concerned.”23
As work was nearing completion in 1943, City Manager Edward S.
Clark claimed in a report that the city should recoup the nearly $100,000
23 “Flood C ontrol Project Will C ost $237,820,” KG, 24 O ctober 1939.
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cost by selling choice building lots in the reclaimed area. Clark also
reminded citizens of why the project had been needed: the land adjacent
to creeks was lower than the river’s ordinary high-water level (which was
reached after any heavy rain or sudden winter thaw). Therefore, water
would back up into the creeks, and hundreds of homes and business
buildings with floors below the normal river level flooded. To remedy
this, ponds had been added to the WPA project to function as storage
basins. Unfortunately, as Clark noted, the ponds would not completely
replace “the natural flood basins lost when the former swampy areas
adjacent to the creeks were filled by property owners to provide home or
building sites,” but once completed, Clark claimed the program would
make the city “virtually free from serious flood damage.”24
The 1940s brought about new interventions in the Kalamazoo River
flood regime, some evolving from local circumstances, others linked to
national events. In 1941, the federal government restricted WPA funds to
defense projects. Kalamazoo found itself shouldering costs for any future
remediation, either by issuing debt or with taxes. In addition, the city
faced a decreasing tax base because its population was decreasing as the
county’s population was growing. This pattern was indicative of the
national trend toward suburban annexation at the expense of urban
centers. The city accumulated a backlog of water-related projects. Having
relied on pumps for water and septic tanks and cesspools for sewage
disposal, the city’s postwar suburban communities required modern
sanitary services to deal with both “the water accumulating in their streets
and yards whenever it rained” and their overflowing septic tanks and
cesspools.25 The city itself had a pressing need for a sewage disposal plant.
As the city struggled to manage its debt, and in the context of inadequate
infrastructure, residents experienced the 1947 flood.26
The April 1947 flood dispelled optimism that the WPA Kalamazoo
flood control project would prevent flooding. The river and creeks
overflowed into neighborhood streets, basements and celery fields
flooded, county roads and bridges washed out, and area businesses were
crippled. The Consumers Power Company announced that the river had

24 “Report Made on Highway Park Plans,” KG, 31 January 1943.
25 Dunbar, Kalamazoo, 189.
26 Ibid., 182-195.
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reached its highest level in twenty-five years, while officials estimated
damages into the millions of dollars.27
Defensive about the system of ponds, sewers, and creeks completed
just a few years prior, Clark and City Engineer Harold L. Andrus blamed
the 1947 flood on fast-rising river levels, which, they said, had prevented
creeks and storm water drains from emptying into the river, thereby
causing a backup. When the city attorney determined that the city was not
liable to pay damages for private homeowners, property owners united. A
coalition of business owners held a public meeting on June 23, 1947, with
approximately seventy-five people attending. The group organized as the
Kalamazoo County Flood Control Committee and elected officers and a
board of directors.28
Under directive from the city commissioners, Clark turned to the
federal government again, but this time citizens wanted and expected more
modern expertise to resolve flooding. Clark contacted Michigan’s US
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, who convinced the Senate that something
needed to be done. On June 24, 1947, the Senate Committee on Public
Works adopted a resolution authorizing the US Army Corps of Engineers
(hereafter Corps) to survey the Kalamazoo River and determine whether
flood-control improvements were advisable. A public hearing in city hall on
January 21, 1948, allowed the Corps to hear city officials’ suggestions for
eliminating causes of flooding and to hear community members’ concerns.
Clark and Andrus went on record in favor of deepening the river through
the city and to the east, making further modifications to river hydrography,
and building low dams on creeks in lowlands and marsh areas. A number
of property owners, business and industrial representatives, and other
interested persons testified during the hearing— “most of them favoring
immediate flood control measures.”29
Thus, Kalamazoo began a long process of seeking “permanent,”
federally funded flood control— a process that involved flood-control
studies, recommendations, authorizations, and appropriations, as well as
efforts to resolve local conflicts between economic and safety concerns.

27 “Rivers, Creeks Go Over Banks,” KG, 6 April 1947; “Damage in City and State
Will Reach Millions,” KG, 7 April 1947.
2B“Defend Flood Control,” KG, 13 April 1947; “City' N ot Liable for Damages Cause
by Flood, Attorney Rules,” KG, 6 May 1947; “Public Meeting on Floods Called,” KG, 22
June 1947; “Group Seeking Method to Ban Floods Forms,” KG, 24 June 1947.
29 “War Department Engineers Plan River Survey,” KG, 29 June 1947; US Senate,
Kalamazoo River, Mich., Kalamagoo and Vicinity, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, S. Doc. 53, v;
“Federal Flood Control Survey Planned Here,” KG, 8 September 1947; “Warns Future
Flood May Be City’s Worst,” KG, 21 January 1948.
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The arguments for federal assistance posited that engineering expertise
and federal dollars would relieve local burdens. Arguments against federal
involvement emphasized that it would result in long delays, require
capitulation to federal rules, and increase local spending. Moreover,
federal legislation was necessary for any proposal involving
appropriations. As Corps Milwaukee District Engineer Colonel J. O.
Colonna explained, “even if a federal control project is presented to the
Kalamazoo ‘community,’ there will be many strings attached,” and he
candidly estimated that the cost to the community would “amount to
about half the cost of the project”— Kalamazoo would be “faced with a
considerable expenditure.”30
Meanwhile, proponents of a local approach to flood control believed
that keeping the river and creeks clear of trash and debris would reduce
flooding. City officials allocated “thousands of dollars” each year to
remove tons of trash that obstructed river and creek flows, as well as
storm sewer drains. While Clark assured residents that the city would do
“all it can” to prevent floods, he cautioned that these clean-up efforts
could only help reduce damages— the city “certainly can’t guarantee the
people that we won’t have another flood!”31 As in past years, city
commissioners authorized $4,000 for a cleanup project in February 1948
in anticipation of the spring thaw.32
Another flood in March 1948 left proponents of federal flood control
feeling vindicated in their efforts. The Gazette again reported the
devastation visiting the city and its surrounds from the swollen
Kalamazoo River and creeks— the 1948 flood crested only one foot
below the 1947 level.33 The Kalamazoo Flood Control Committee— the
citizen action group formed following the 1947 flood— petitioned the city
commission to “fulfill its obligation” to residents and employees in the
Portage and Axtell Creek areas by removing obstructions, installing
adequate storm sewers, removing filth from stream beds, and restraining
industries from upstream dumping. The group’s spokesman and attorney,
Austin J. Doyle, accused the city of consigning residents and businesses
in the area “to the status of a slum.” Doyle further claimed that the city

30 “U.S. Engineers Making 2-Year Study o f Area,” KG, 22 February 1948.
31 “Prepare Creeks As Precaution Against Floods,” KG, 10 February 1948.
32 “U.S. Engineers.”
33 “Over 17,000 Tons Topsoil Washed Away,” KG, 28 March 1948.
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allowing upstream paper mills to pollute the creek had sacrificed residents
and businesses for industry.34
Obstruction of surface water sources, however, was only one
contributor to the city’s flooding problem. As the city suffered a
particularly rainy spring in 1948, the Gazette highlighted not only the city’s
drainage challenges but also the effects of manipulating natural systems.
Again, there was hope for resolution through human ingenuity:
Like many other cities which are situated in river
valleys, Kalamazoo is confronted with the fact that when
man upsets Nature’s balance he must devise his own
means of correcting the imbalance thus caused.
Translated into less philosophical and more specific
terms, this means that if we are going to build modern
cities and let them grow we must do something to offset
the effects of the resulting interference with natural
drainage.
We don’t want mosquito-breeding swamps in our
urban communities, so we fill them in__ We don’t want
flooded basements or yards if we can avoid them, so
when we are building on low ground we try to build a
little higher than the surrounding area. All these things
are logical, natural, and sensible, but the fact remains that
they have their effects on the drainage problem. . . .
The hope is that major improvements in the
drainage capacity of the Kalamazoo river . . . will
eventually provide a final and complete correction of
flood conditions in this community.35
As the article revealed, despite knowledge of the destructive
consequences of human encroachment on floodplains, those activities
remained, in their thinking, “logical” and “sensible.” Growth and
development would continue, and so would the hope that human
ingenuity could outwit nature. Beyond the ephemeral moment o f the
article was a larger collective tendency to forget about floods later, to seek
a return to normalcy, and to lose a sense o f urgency for costly changes to
avoid future floods.

34 “More Than 200 Petition for Flood Relief,” KG, 4 May 1948.
35 “Kalamazoo’s Drainage Problem,” KG, 13 May 1948.
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For its part, the Corps of Engineers did not abandon its pursuit of a
federal flood control program for the Kalamazoo River. Corps District
Engineer Colonna submitted an initial survey report on July 22,1949. He
determined that the most practical plan would widen, deepen, and
straighten the river channel through the city, add a low-flow control dam
to offset the impact of river modifications on well-water users and
farmers, and enlarge the lower portion of Portage Creek. The proposed
improvements, Colonna noted, would “eliminate eighty percent of the
flood damages in the area” by providing “complete protection against
damage” from floods up to fifty percent larger than the 1904 flood. Initial
estimated costs for the project totaled $4,325,000, with the federal share
determined at $3,975,000. In addition to paying its share of the costs, the
city’s obligations included furnishing necessary land and easements,
releasing the federal government from any damages, maintaining and
operating the project after completion, preventing encroachments, and
making changes to city utilities necessitated by channel improvements.
The Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors agreed with Colonna’s
recommendations, with one additional proviso: before spending any
federal funds and beginning construction, the city must address pollution
of the Kalamazoo River from sewer and industrial waste discharges.36
After three years, it seemed that federal assistance might be
forthcoming. But unforeseen obstacles slowed the momentum. The
Kalamazoo project was part of a billion-dollar public works bill that
included other projects nationwide. On August 10, 1956, Michigan’s
Congressman August E. Johansen delivered the unwelcome news that
President Dwight D. Eisenhower had vetoed this “pork barrel” bill.
Eisenhower signed a revised bill in July 1958, but project commencement
remained years away. First, the Corps had to complete a more detailed
engineering study; second, federal funding for the project required
separate legislation; and third, benefiting communities had to appropriate
their “matching” funds and comply with project prerequisites.37

36 US Senate, S. Doc. 53, 1-6, 31-36, 39-41. The federal Flood Control Act of 1936
and Flood Control Act of 1944 required “local cooperation” as a condition for federal
projects that predominandy benefitted local interests.
37 “Make Flood Control Plans Now,” KG, 1 August 1956; “Flood Works Bill Vetoed
by President,” KG, 10 August 1956; “Ike Kills Kalamazoo River Bill,” KG, 15 April 1958;
“Ike Backs Sound Water Bill,” KG, 27 April 1958; “Ike Signs Local River Flood Bill,” KG,
4 July 1958; “Paper Details Come First,” KG, 7 July 1958.
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State and Regional Solutions

As Kalamazooans continued to balance local and federal solutions,
the State of Michigan weighed in. Historically, state officials had taken an
active role in managing the state’s water sources: its Great Lakes, its
36,000 miles of rivers and streams, and its 11,000 inland lakes. While these
resources established major themes in the state’s history— navigation,
shipping, commerce, water-based industries, sports, and recreation—
inland water resources also commanded attention to drainage, pollution,
and flooding. Indeed, early in Michigan’s state history, its legislature
adopted laws to address problems with water that threatened the health
and welfare of citizens.
As early as 1897, Michigan passed a law to provide for construction
and maintenance of drains and establish a method to pay for the work.
From that start, state drainage law evolved with amendments made every
few years, adding procedures for situations when conflicts of interest
arose, for drainage improvements using mechanical pumps, for permits
to use county drains for sewage disposal, for establishment of a revolving
fund for drain construction, and for establishment of county and
agricultural drainage districts. By 1956, the mounting amendments
necessitated a reorganization and recodification of the law, which at that
point not only governed drainage but also, specifically, provided for flood
control projects.38
In another early foray into state oversight of water matters, legislators
placed pollution control under the purview of the state Department of
Conservation, created in 1921. In 1929, the state became one of a few to
create a Stream Control Commission with the sole purpose of protecting
the state’s waters from waste disposal by municipalities, industries, public
or private corporations, individuals, or any other entity.39 Writing in 1946,
after seventeen years of commission efforts, however, commission chair
William DeKleine voiced his frustration about the continued level of
pollution, calling it “far greater today than before the war.” DeKleine’s
frustration was also directed at the commission’s inability to achieve its
goal, noting the lack of staffing and funding needed for pollution control
“on the scale necessary to meet the multitude of problems which
Michigan’s water resources and their conflicting uses present.” To make

38 M ichigan Public A c ts (hereafter A c ts ) 1897 PA 254; A c ts 1901 PA 27; A c ts 1909 PA
69; A c t s 1911 PA 208; A c t s 1915 PA 2 % ; A c ts 1921 PA 95 - A c t s 1923 PA 31 6 ; A c ts 1929
PA 158; A c ts 1931 PA 243; A c t s 1932 PA 38; A c ts 1949 PA 247; A c t s 1956 PA 40.
39A c ts 1921 PA 11; A c ts 1929 PA 245.
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matters worse, the sources of pollution went beyond municipal sewer
systems and industrial waste disposal— a significant amount of pollution
originated from state institutions such as hospitals and universities. In his
opinion, some exceptions were needed to avoid charges of the state
violating its own laws, which also made the commission’s job of enforcing
pollution abatement for others more difficult.40
On May 17, 1949, state lawmakers reorganized the commission in an
attempt to encourage more cooperation. Under the 1949 act, the
commission’s name was changed to the Water Resources Commission,
and it added three citizen members: one each from groups representing
industrial management, municipalities, and conservation associations. In
addition to the commission’s original responsibility to control pollution,
the law specifically required that the commission provide advice and
support for any flood-control and drainage districts. Thus, the new
commission became the “middle man” between local and federal
governments for flood control projects. Exercising its new
responsibilities, the commission met with the Corps in January 1950 in
connection with Kalamazoo’s pursuit of a federal flood-control project.
To appease one of the Corps’ reservations about the project, the
commission declared its intent to “establish as its objective in the
Kalamazoo area, the cleanup of all pollution detrimental to the proposed
flood-control project within the next 3- to 5-year period.”41
The commission’s 1950-1952 report to Governor G. Mennen
Williams and members of the legislature reaffirmed conflicts attendant to
the state’s “most important natural resource,” noting that water was, at
times, also “one of the great agents of destruction.” The commission
reported that “direct damage to property along inland rivers by seasonal
floods has been estimated at more than $1,500,000 per year in Michigan.”
Based on experience, the commission expected flood damages to increase
in the future “under the double threat of continued, unrestricted
encroachments by permanent building” in floodplains and stream
40 William DeKleine to Andrew W. Fleming, Press Secretary, Executive Office,
“Stream Control Commission,” August 1946, “Legislative Committee on Stream
Pollution,” Record 65-51-A, box 1, folder 14, Michigan History Center, Lansing, MI
(hereafter MHC).
41 Acts 1949 PA 117; Michigan Water Resources Commission, Combined Second and
Third Annual Reports, 1950-1952 (Lansing: Water Resources Commission, 1952), 16; US
Senate, S. Doc. 53, x.
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obstruction originating, in part, from industrial waste disposal practices.
Yet, in 1952, the commission’s regulations had not addressed these
threats, and the commission and the public still looked to structural
approaches to correct flooding problems.42
Regional efforts to manage water resources also complicated matters.
The commission sponsored the ninth Midwestern States Flood Control
Conference on the campus of Michigan State College in East Lansing in
June 1954. Representatives from nine Midwestern states attended the
conference to discuss hydrological and legal aspects of water management.
Commission chairman and director of conservation Gerald E. Eddy
presented a paper on the problems of water management in Michigan,
noting that the abundance of water had presented problems in terms of
managing the state’s water resources— chiefly, “a persisting public attitude
of taking water for granted,” which in turn had led to “a lack of public
understanding of how water resources behave”— citing the example of
encroachment on floodplains. The “most complex” problem, however, was
that of stream flow stabilization— managing seasonal river levels would
require “varied, widespread, and carefully coordinated” efforts.43
Conference attendees also discussed the challenge of keeping the
public informed of water resource issues. The commission explained its
goal of presenting “a clear, concise picture” of what had happened in the
past and what might be expected in the future. Its message held particular
significance, the commission noted, because “many homes and
businesses have been built in the flood plain” due to a lack of public
information. “Floods that have occurred tend to be ‘soon forgotten,”’ it
warned, and “each new structure added in these damaged areas awaits the
rise of uncontrolled waters inundating the flood plains.”44 The
commission’s 1954 report on flood conditions in the state’s capital was
prompted, in part, by the weather event in 1947, which had caused
significant damage to property along the Grand and Cedar Rivers in
Lansing. Unlike Kalamazoo, settlement in Lansing had begun on higher
land, but as the city grew its lowlands became more valuable for
commercial, industrial, and residential use. At the time of its report, the
commission stated that development had continued with nearly all of the
42 Michigan Water Resources Commission, Combined Reports, 15-17,45-46.
43 Gerald E. Eddy, “Basic Problems o f Water Management in Michigan,” in Michigan
Water Resources Commission, Talks and Papers Presentedat Ninth Midwestern States Flood Control
Conference (Lansing: Michigan Water Resources Commission, 20 January 1955), 15-20.
44 Michigan Water Resources Commission, Flood Conditions in the Fansing Area
(Lansing: Michigan Water Resources Commission, September 1954), 2.
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floodplains utilized, and, if a flood of the same or greater magnitude as
the 1904 flood were to occur again in the 1950s, the commission
esdmated it would cause flood damages in excess of $5 million in
Lansing.45 With its report, the commission met its goal of presenting
information to help inform the public and policy makers of flood dangers
and associated challenges.
The state adopted an intermediary position during the 1950s, and
state legislators approved laws that enabled local units of government to
take action. In 1952, the state authorized local governments to acquire
land and contract with the federal government for flood-control projects
for the public good. In 1956, legislators approved procedures for local
governmental units to establish water management districts with the
authority to undertake drainage and flood-control improvements to
eliminate problems jeopardizing the health and safety of individuals. In
1964, lawmakers also authorized two or more local governments to
collaborate and petition to establish a river management district, which
would have the power to acquire, construct, operate, and finance water
storage or other river control facilities. Over the years, the state had
further enabled local control of land use and flood prevention by
providing legal authorization to establish local planning commissions and
zoning laws, as well as granting powers to effect and enforce local goals
by issuing bonds, assessing taxes, policing through use of ordinances and
regulations, appropriating and budgeting, and utilizing eminent domain.46
Beginning in the late 1960s, state legislation reflected a more
authoritative approach to flood control, in keeping with changes occurring
in Washington, DC. As Congress debated the details of a national flood
insurance program, Michigan legislators adopted the Subdivision Control
Act of 1967, mainly directed at alleviating indiscriminate land subdivision
practices but also requiring state agency reviews when a proposed
subdivision involved flood-prone areas. In 1968, state lawmakers passed
the Floodplain Control Act, giving the commission responsibility for
ensuring stricter controls over alterations and obstructions to watercourses

45 Ibid, 3-4.
^Acts 1952 PA 278; Acts 1956 PA 40; Acts 1964 PA 253; Michigan Department of
Natural Resources, Division of Land Resource Programs, Floodplain Management and State
Action in Prevention of Flood Damage (Lansing: Michigan Department of Natural Resources,
December 1977), 29-32.
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and floodplains. As authorized under that act, the commission issued
regulations for floodplain control, which prohibited future interference
with the natural function of floodplains with a drainage area of at least two
square miles (except in specified circumstances).47
A reorganization and restructuring of agencies charged with
managing the state’s natural resources occurred in the late 1960s and
1970s. In 1969, all functions o f the Department of Conservation
transferred to a new Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and the
Water Resources Commission became a division of the DNR. Declaring
that, “despite the great effort of conservationists, man still misuses and
mistreats his environment,” Governor William Milliken created an
advisory council for environmental quality. Milliken’s order tasked the
council with investigating and evaluating the effectiveness of
environmental management programs and making recommendations,
using available expertise, to advance “the art of environmental quality
management.” The council’s working priority list was long, but it included
the need for zoning to protect floodplains and open space in urban areas
and water management for purposes of flood control. In 1973, Milliken
designated the DNR as the state entity responsible for developing and
coordinating all environmental matters.48
Another matter that captured Milliken’s attention was land use— an
issue that combined environmental issues with economic development. In
November 1970, Milliken established a special commission on land use to
consider and recommend possible programs aimed at protecting future
land use needs. For “the best interests of the public,” the special
commission identified critical land use areas: urbanizing areas, prime
agricultural land, recreational land, and unique and natural resource areas.
The special commission’s report, dated December 1971, referred to the
rapid growth of urbanized land in southern Michigan— an increase from
669,000 acres in 1940 to 1,722,000 acres in 1961— and the conflicting
demands on the limited land resources, which called for action to achieve
the goal of a “better society.” Believing that state management of land use
practices was necessary to ensure the future health of the state’s citizens,
the special commission recommended tax reform to correct existing
41Acts 1967 PA 288; Acts 1968 PA 167; Michigan Administrative Code 1954 ACS 62, sec.
323.201, et seq.\ Michigan Department o f Natural Resources, Floodplain Management, 26-28.
48Acts 1969 PA 208; Michigan Executive O rder 1969-1; Michigan Office o f Planning
Coordination, Bureau o f Policies and Programs, Technical Report J - l l , Environmental
Quality in Michigan (Lansing: Michigan Office o f Planning Coordination, February 1970),
1-4; Michigan Executive Order 1973-2.
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conflicts of interest. The proposed law would correct the state’s “ad-hoc
approach to establishing priorities.”49 In 1974, the legislature passed one
component of the special commission’s recommendations— a law aimed at
preserving valuable agricultural land and open spaces— permitting
landowners to enter into agreements pledging they would not sell their land
to developers in exchange for tax benefits. Unfortunately for the
proponents of an omnibus land use control law, the farmland preservation
act generated debates. With critics viewing the policies as inappropriate
government interference in private property decisions and market
functions, the land use control law never received legislative approval.50
The conflicts surrounding land use and water resources continued,
despite the state’s efforts. The state’s flooding problems continued as
well. After the 1975 flood on the Kalamazoo, Grand, Flint, and
Shiawassee Rivers, legislators approved the Emergency Preparedness
Act of 1976, which offered state protection and recovery from natural
and man-made disasters within the state and broadened the definition
of disasters to include such events as floods. The DN R prepared a
floodplain management report in 1977, which presented an overview of
why floods occur, the problems they create, the range of potential flood
prevention and damage control measures, and actions taken at all levels
of government to control floods. After conceding that “we are losing
the battle of flood control,” the DN R stated the “obvious”: “the
solution to the flood damage problem lies with the wisdom applied in
the use of the floodplain.” Flood prevention instead of flood control
guided the D N R’s response to flooding in the late 1970s. The DNR
posited that instead of “trying to keep rivers away from man, keep man
away from the rivers— for floods are natural acts while flood losses
result from the acts of man, a payment which nature extracts in return
for occupation of her flood plain.”51

49 Audrey Gunn to William A. Ryan, 13 September 1971, and Special Commission
on Land Use, “Land Use Programs for Michigan: A Framework for Action,” 14 December
1971, “Legislature, Special Committees, 1971, Land Use,” Record 82-126, Box 4, Folder
10, MHC.
i0Acts 1974 PA 116; Public Sector Consultants, Inc., “Land Use and Sustainability,”
in Michigan in Brief, 2002-03, 7th ed., sponsored by the Michigan Nonprofit Association
and the Council of Michigan Foundation (Lansing: Public Sector Consultants, Inc.),
michiganinbrief.org/edition07/Chapter5/LandUse.htm (accessed 30 March 2017).
51 Acts 1976 PA 390; Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Floodplain
Management, 12, 24-32.
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Solutions proffered to manage flooding problems had failed. The
DNR’s suggestion for flood prevention appeared sound, as the costs of
flood damage continued to rise. But their actions could not keep up with
the demands of modern cities to grow, not only geographically but also
economically. A destructive flood event would catch residents and
government officials in a web of conflicting concerns. How could modern
cities prevent flooding and cosdy damage? Who would decide what flood
prevention measures to take, and who would pay for those measures?
Would that action produce the desired results without causing other
problems? Although dissenting voices warned that urban growth and
development threatened the health and safety of communities, economic
concerns drowned out those warnings.
The Economics of Environmentalism
By the 1975 flood, the federal flood-control project for the
Kalamazoo River, initiated in 1947, remained only a “fond dream” for its
surviving proponents. The federal government now favored a new
approach to flood control, one that reflected ideas of an ascendant
environmental movement. The National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP), authorized in 1968 during President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
administration, changed the direction of federal flood control assistance.
Instead of structural means, the federal government would subsidize an
insurance program that required local regulation of floodplain
development and individual purchase of flood insurance policies.
Initially proposed in the 1950s to control the rising costs of federal
flood disaster assistance, the NFIP finally passed Congress in 1968 as part
of a comprehensive Housing and Urban Development Act aimed at
addressing the nation’s housing crisis. Flooding presented a threat to
housing and living conditions in urban communities, and the program’s
proponents believed that a properly designed insurance program would
help reverse the visible impact of flooding in cities. Michigan’s
Subdivision Control Act of 1967, Floodplain Control Act of 1968, and
floodplain control regulations aligned with the nonstructural approach
endorsed under the NFIP. The aim was to control the economic and
social costs of flood losses. State officials further included the NFIP in
the state’s overall program of floodplain management. A state coordinator
worked with local governments on compliance, providing not only
education, technical assistance, and oversight for communities, but also
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assistance for lenders, realtors, and insurance agents. The state’s efforts
retained a commitment to seeking any available federal funding.52
Implementing the NFIP unleashed old ideological objections to the
program. Opponents from the insurance industry objected to
government interference; federalists objected to a federally mandated
program; capitalists called the program socialisdc. Community leaders
worried about the impact of regulating use of valuable land in floodplains
and a decreasing urban tax base. Individuals wondered how the household
budget could absorb the cost of another insurance policy.
Community decisions to participate in the program reflected a
convoluted mix of both economic and environmental pressures. At
midcentury, Kalamazooans had decided to abandon the pay-as-you-go
system in their efforts to address the city’s growing needs. In this new era,
under the leadership of City Manager Clarence H. Elliott, voters approved
a 12,870,000 bond issue to help finance the “long-delayed” sewage
disposal plant. Elected commissioners increased property taxes and
voters approved another bond issue for a host of other capital
improvements, including modernizing streets, constructing new pumping
stations and a water utility building, adding a new bridge over the river,
acquiring land for a police and municipal court building, and acquiring
land to expand the airport. In 1955 and 1956, five communities had voted
in favor of annexation to the city, more than doubling the city’s area and
increasing the city’s responsibility to provide services. Accommodating
the acquisitions meant additional expenses for the city, and voters
approved municipal bonds of $1,970,000 for storm sewers and more than
$2,000,000 for sanitary sewers (one-quarter of which would be paid for
by a tax assessment).53
The city’s existence, identity, and growth had relied on its direct
relationship with its own natural resources and landscape. As the city
grew, however, that relationship grew less visible to residents and
policymakers. As late as 1947, almost one thousand acres in the county
remained devoted to growing celery. By 1960, the industry had practically
disappeared. Although growers named several causes for this decline, one

52 Michigan Departm ent o f Environmental Quality, “National Flood Insurance
Program,” michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3684_3725-9380--,00.html (accessed 5
April 2017).
53 Dunbar, Kalamazoo, 196-204; Massie and Schmitt, Kalamazoo: The Place, 202.
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significant reason pointed to the paper mills’ deep wells, which had drawn
too much water from the subsoil needed for celery. Following World War
II, land utilized for celery farms also became valuable real estate to meet
the booming demands for residential and industrial development.54
Communities negotiated the costs of these changes, both in terms of
environmental health and economic viability. Despite their intimate
relationship with the landscape, and their hard-won knowledge that
manipulation and overuse created flood problems, communities like
Kalamazoo continued to prioritize economic priorities and hope that
human ingenuity would, someday, overcome the threat of flooding.
The advent of flood insurance coverage further obscured the
important issues Kalamazoo still faced. Even the N FIP’s original purpose
became lost. Before communities and individuals could fully participate in
the NFIP, some technical and time-consuming steps had to occur. First,
the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) had to create and issue Flood
Flazard Boundary Maps (FHBM). Second, if a community agreed to join
the NFIP after receiving its FHBM, it entered the N FIP’s initial, or
“emergency,” stage, permitting residents to purchase flood insurance on a
limited basis. Third, based on the community’s agreement to participate,
the FIA would conduct a flood insurance study and contract with an
engineering firm to prepare a more technical Flood Insurance Rate Map
(FIRM), which permitted the community to enter the NFIP’s “regular”
program. Lastly, the community' needed to adopt floodplain regulations
within one year of receiving its FIRM. If the community' did not take this
final step to participate in the NFIP’s “regular” phase, its citizens could not
purchase new flood insurance policies, and it could not renew any existing
flood insurance policies at the end of the stated policy period.55
The case of Kalamazoo demonstrates the long process required to
implement the NFIP. Kalamazoo received its FHBM on February 15,1974,
almost six years after the NFIP’s introduction. The following year, the city
commission adopted a resolution to enter the NFIP’s “emergency”
component. In order to advance to the “regular” component, a
consultation meeting occurred in the spring of 1978 to determine existing
information and additional studies needed. After studying overflows from
54 Dunbar, 130,193-195; Jakle and Wheeler, “Dutch Population in Kalamazoo,” 457;
Massie and Schmitt, Kalamazoo: The Place, 172.
55 The Institute of Rational Design, Inc., Guidebook fo r Communities: N ational Flood
Insurance Program (New York: The Institute of Rational Design, Inc., September 1977), 18;
J ames R. Quinn, Thirty Years in Deep Water: The N F I P and Its Strugglefor Significance (Belleville,
Ontario: Epic Press, 2000), 84-88.
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the Kalamazoo River, Portage Creek, and Arcadia Creek, representatives
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an engineering
firm, and the community met to review and approve the results in mid1982. After approval, FEMA issued its report dated November 1984—
more than ten years after Kalamazoo had received its FHBM.56
With FEMA’s report in hand, city officials faced a six-month deadline
to adopt floodplain regulations to retain eligibility to participate in the NFIP
and advance to the “regular” program. The city’s zoning laws adopted in
1954 had not included floodplain restrictions. City Planner Gary P.
Niemeck drafted a proposed floodplain management ordinance, which he
forwarded to city officials for review. As required by local law, public
notices and hearings provided information and opportunities for comment.
The city’s Office of Economic Development and Planning recommended
adoption of the proposed ordinance, with a warning that failure to adopt
the regulations would render floodplain property owners ineligible for
mortgages, loans, grants, or any other funding directly or indirectly
connected with a federal agency. The executive director of the Kalamazoo
Downtown Development Authority (DDA) wrote to Mayor Francis P.
Hamilton and the city commissioners on March 12,1985, urging adoption
of the proposed floodplain regulations to ensure protection of the
“financial health of property owners in the floodplain” and avoid loss of
“future funding” for “needed improvements in the floodplains.” Although
noting the added burden on developers and real estate investors of “yet
another layer of construction regulations,” the DDA believed the city had
“little choice but to adopt the regulations.”57 Following a public hearing on
March 18, the commissioners adopted the ordinance, adding a chapter to
the city’s zoning law. The new law included a cautionary section: its
provisions, based on scientific and engineering recommendations, offered
a reasonable degree of regulatory flood protection; its provisions did not
imply that larger floods or floods outside the identified hazard areas would
not occur; and its provisions did not create any city liability for flood
56 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Flood Insurance Study: City of Kalamazoo,
Kalamazoo County, Michigan (November 1984), 2-4, 10.
57 Gary P. Niemeck to Sheryl L. Sculley, January 21,1985, memorandum, Kalamazoo
City Attorney’s Office, Freedom of Information Act Coordinator (KCAO); Gary P.
Niemeck to City Planning Commission, January' 15,1985, memorandum, KCAO; Gary' P.
Niemeck to City Commission, February' 13, 1985, KCAO; James A. Visser to Francis P.
Hamilton and Members of the City Commission, March 12, 1985, KCAO.

106

The Michigan Historical Review

damages resulting from reliance on the regulations. Thus, Kalamazoo
entered the NFIP regular program on May 1 ,1985.58
With the complicated process behind them, Kalamazooans
presumably could rest assured that they had taken the necessary
precautions against flood damages. Yet participating in the NFIP did not
prevent flooding or flood damages. A 1988-1989 U.S. Geological Survey
summary of flooding stated that “the most extensive and damaging flood
o f record” occurred in the central Lower Peninsula in September 1986,
causing approximately $500 million in damages. Although stating that
major flooding in Michigan was not frequent, the USGS report quoted an
average annual flood damage amount of $60 million-$100 million.59
Furthermore, enforcing floodplain regulations remained a community
mandate and purchasing flood insurance policies remained an individual
responsibility— an individual choice which has proved unpopular, as only
a fraction of insurable structures are covered by flood insurance.60
C o n clu sio n

Riverine cities and towns across Michigan had a history of
problematic flooding. Flooding represented a risk that could occur at any
time under the right conditions, but because of its unpredictability and
irregularity, the threat was often forgotten in favor o f more immediate or
desirable economic concerns. As demonstrated with the case of
Kalamazoo, settlement and growth placed residents and businesses in an
unhealthy and dangerous position when the river flooded. Despite
awareness of the river’s propensity to flood and the inadvisability of
developing floodplains, urban residents approached their flood problems
with hopes that management and expertise, with sufficient funding, could
overcome nature. Government officials working with engineering and
scientific experts also believed that some combination of management,
manipulation, and methodology would provide future solutions.
Continued growth led to destructive flooding. But it was also persistent
58 City of Kalamazoo Ordinance Nos. 439 and 1345.
59 US Geological Survey, “M ichigan D roughts and F loods,” in Water-Supply
Paper
2375,
National
Water
Summary
1988-89— Floods
and
Droughts,
http://md.water.usgs.gov/publications/wsp-2375/mi/index.html (accessed 15 March 2017).
60 Federal Emergenq- Management Agency, “Community Status Book Report: Michigan,”
fem a.gov/cis/M I.pdf (accessed 15 March 2017); Michigan D epartm ent o f
Environmental Quality', “Floodplain M anagement/Nadonal Flood Insurance,”
michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3684_3725—,00.html (accessed 4 April 2017);
Michigan Department o f Environmental Quality, “National Flood Insurance Program,”
michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3684_3725-9380-,00.html (accessed 31 January
2018).
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attitudes about private property rights and the pursuit of economic
“progress” that, despite a working knowledge of floodplain risks and also
the rise of environmentalism even at local levels, ultimately overrode
concerns for community and landscape protection.
The N FIP represented an environmentally conscious management
technique that also offered economic benefits. By following state and
federal governments’ approved path toward flood prevention,
communities gained eligibility for their residents to receive federally
subsidized flood insurance, federally backed mortgages, and eligibility
for federal funds in the event of a major disaster. Yet the modern and
enlightened management approach did not successfully curb ongoing
urban growth, meaning that the best flood insurance coverage could do
was to offset the costs of flood damage.
By way o f an epilogue, the city of Kalamazoo and Kalamazoo County
have recently experienced more destructive flooding that threatened
community viability. The 2018 spring rains caused a “historic crest” of
the Kalamazoo River and $2.5 million in damages. Affected businesses
and homeowners learned that, unfortunately, this flood was far less
damaging than the last major event in 2008, and this time, the county did
not qualify for federal funds under a state of emergency.61 These events
are as distressing for today’s residents as historical floods were to earlier
citizens. But they should not be a surprise. Economics, politics, and
cultural attitudes curtailed the effectiveness of past approaches, while
facilitating floodplain encroachments that remain in place today.
Likewise, Kalamazoo’s flood history reveals past limitations of
environmentalist approaches to urban landscapes. Hopes that floodplain
regulations would result in a changed philosophy and “keep [people] away
from the rivers” were as much wishful thinking as the hope that continued
growth would not interfere with the success of expensive flood control
efforts. And yet, humans must hold onto hope. Indeed, research into and
experiments with new “soft landscape armor” floodplain restoration
methods, combined with local sustainability initiatives and flood warning
systems, may lead toward more workable solutions to protect urban
floodplains and urban dwellers. While history cannot be undone, it can
inform the path toward the future.
61 “$2.5M in Damage Caused by Kalamazoo Record-Breaking Floods,”
MLive,
9
March
2018,
mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2018/03/
flood_victims_form_coalition_t.html (accessed 9 November 2018).
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